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I. INTRODUCTION 
After the controversy over WikiLeaks erupted,1 members of Congress 
introduced the proposed SHIELD Act (“the Act”), which would have 
amended the Espionage Act of 1917 to make it a crime for any person 
knowingly and willfully to disseminate, in any manner prejudicial to the 
                                                                                                             
 * Geoffrey R. Stone is the Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of Law at 
the University of Chicago.  
1. WikiLeaks is an international online organization created by Julian Assange that 
publishes submissions of classified data from anonymous sources. About: What is 
WikiLeaks?, WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.org/About.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). In 
November 2010, WikiLeaks collaborated with major global media organizations to release 
thousands of classified U.S. State Department diplomatic cables allegedly leaked to 
WikiLeaks by Army Private Bradley Manning. See, e.g., Bradley Manning, N.Y.TIMES: 
TIMES TOPICS (Jan. 12, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/ 
m/bradley_e_manning/index.html. The cables included revelations of the views of 
American diplomats relating to such matters as the Middle East peace process, nuclear 
disarmament, actions in the War on Terror, climate change, and U.S. intelligence and 
counterintelligence efforts. Id. 
478 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64 
safety or interest of the United States, “any classified information”2 
“concerning the human intelligence activities of the United States or . . 
. concerning the identity of a classified source or informant”3 working with 
the intelligence community of the United States.  
Although the Act might be constitutional as applied to a government 
employee, like Bradley Manning, who “leaks” such classified material, it is 
plainly unconstitutional as applied to others, like Julian Assange and 
WikiLeaks, who subsequently publish or otherwise disseminate such 
information. With respect to such other individuals or organizations, the 
Act violates the First Amendment unless, at the very least, it is expressly 
limited to situations in which the individual knows that the dissemination 
of the classified material poses a clear and present danger of grave harm to 
the nation. 
The clear and present danger standard, in varying forms, has been a 
central element of our First Amendment jurisprudence ever since Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes first enunciated it in his 1919 opinion in Schenck v. 
United States.4 In the ninety years since Schenck, the precise meaning of 
“clear and present danger” has shifted,5 but the principle that animates the 
standard was stated eloquently by Justice Louis D. Brandeis in his brilliant 
1927 concurring opinion in Whitney v. California:  
Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards . . . . 
They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty . . . . Only an emergency 
can justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be 
reconciled with freedom. Such . . . is the command of the Constitution. 
It is therefore, always open to Americans to challenge a law abridging 
free speech . . . by showing that there was no emergency justifying it.6 
With that observation in mind, I will examine two central questions: (1) 
Does the clear and present danger standard apply to unlawful leaks of 
classified information by government employees?; and (2) Does the clear 
and present danger standard apply to the dissemination of classified 
information derived from those unlawful leaks? These are fundamental 
                                                                                                             
 2.  18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (1996). 
 3.  H.R. 6506, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 4.  249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 5.  See Frank Strong, Fifty Years of “Clear and Present Danger”: From Schenck to 
Brandenburg – and Beyond, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 41. Cf. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52; Dennis v. 
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); N.Y. Times 
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS 
TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM (2004) [hereinafter PERILOUS TIMES]. 
 6.  274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled in part by 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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First Amendment questions. Before turning to them, though, a bit of 
historical context is necessary.  
II. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FREE SPEECH 
A wartime environment inevitably intensifies the tension between 
individual liberty and national security. But there are wise and unwise ways 
to strike the appropriate balance. Throughout American history, our 
government has excessively restricted public discourse in the name of 
national security. In 1798, for example, on the eve of a threatened conflict 
with France, Congress enacted the Sedition Act of 1798, which effectively 
made it a crime for any person to criticize the president, Congress, or the 
government itself.7 During the Civil War, the government shut down 
“disloyal” newspapers and imprisoned critics of the president’s policies.8 
During World War I, the government enacted the Espionage Act of 1917 
and the Sedition Act of 1918, which made it unlawful for any person to 
criticize the war, the draft, the government, the president, the flag, the 
military, or the cause of the United States.9 As a consequence, free and 
open debate was almost completely stifled.10 Later, during the Cold War, 
as Americans were whipped into frenzy of fear of the “Red Menace,” 
loyalty programs, political infiltration, blacklisting, legislative 
investigations, and criminal prosecutions of supposed Communist 
“subversives” and sympathizers swept the nation.11 
Over time, we have come to understand that these episodes from our 
past were grievous errors in judgment in which we allowed fear and 
anxiety to override our good judgment and our essential commitment to 
individual liberty and democratic self-governance. We have come to 
understand that, in order to maintain a robust system of democratic self-
governance, our government cannot constitutionally be empowered to 
punish speakers, even in the name of national security without a compelling 
justification.12 This is especially true in the realm of government secrets, 
for as James Madison observed, “[a] popular Government, without popular 
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a 
Tragedy; or, perhaps both.”13 As Madison warned, if citizens do not know 
                                                                                                             
 7.  See GEOFFREY R. STONE, WAR AND LIBERTY: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: 1790 TO THE 
PRESENT 1–21 (2007).  
 8.  See id. at 22–40. 
 9.  See id. at 41–63. 
 10.  See id.  
 11.  See id. at 85–106. 
 12.  See STONE, supra note 5, at 550–57. 
 13.  JAMES MADISON, 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons 1910) (1822). 
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what their own government is doing, then they are hardly in a position to 
question its judgments or to hold their elected representatives accountable. 
Government secrecy, although sometimes surely necessary, can also pose a 
direct threat to the very idea of self-governance. 
III. THE DILEMMA 
Here, then, is the dilemma: the government often has exclusive 
possession of information about its policies, programs, processes, and 
activities that would be of great value to informed public debate. But 
government officials often insist that such information must be kept secret, 
even from those to whom they are accountable—the American people. 
How should we resolve this dilemma? The issue is complex and has many 
dimensions. 
The reasons why government officials want secrecy, for example, are 
many and varied. They range from the truly compelling to the patently 
illegitimate. Sometimes, government officials may want secrecy because 
they fear that the disclosure of certain information might seriously 
undermine the nation’s security (for example, by revealing detailed battle 
plans on the eve of battle). Sometimes, they may want secrecy because they 
simply do not want to deal with public criticism of their decisions, or 
because they do not want the public, Congress, or the courts to be in a 
position to override their decisions, which they believe to be sound. 
Sometimes, they may want secrecy because disclosure will expose their 
own incompetence, foolishness, or wrongdoing. Some of these reasons for 
secrecy are obviously much more worthy of respect than others. Part of the 
problem is that government officials who want secrecy for questionable 
reasons are often tempted to justify their actions by putting forth seemingly 
compelling, but in reality exaggerated or even disingenuous, justifications. 
Adding to the complexity, the contribution of any particular 
disclosure to informed public discourse may vary widely depending upon 
the nature of the information and the surrounding circumstances. The 
disclosure of some classified information may be extremely valuable to 
public debate (for example, the revelation of possibly unwise or even 
unlawful or unconstitutional government programs, such as the secret use 
of coercive interrogation or the secret authorization of widespread 
electronic surveillance). The disclosure of other confidential information, 
however, may be of little or no legitimate value to public debate (for 
example, the publication of the specific identities of covert American 
agents in Iran for no reason other than exposure). 
The most vexing problem arises when the public disclosure of secret 
information is both harmful to the national security and valuable to self-
governance. Suppose, for example, the government undertakes a study of 
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the effectiveness of security measures at the nation’s nuclear power plants. 
The study concludes that several nuclear power plants are especially 
vulnerable to terrorist attack. Should this study be kept secret or should it 
be disclosed to the public? On the one hand, publishing the report will 
reveal our vulnerabilities to terrorists. On the other hand, publishing the 
report would alert the public to the situation, enable citizens to press 
government officials to remedy the problems and empower the public to 
hold accountable those public officials who failed to keep them safe. The 
public disclosure of such information could both harm and benefit the 
nation. Should the study be made public? 
In theory, this question can be framed quite simply: do the benefits of 
disclosure outweigh its costs? That is, does the value of the disclosure to 
informed public deliberation outweigh its danger to the national security? 
Alas, as a practical matter this simple framing of the issue is not terribly 
helpful. It is exceedingly difficult to measure in any objective, consistent, 
predictable, or coherent manner either the value of the disclosure to public 
discourse or its danger to national security. And it is even more difficult to 
balance such incommensurable values against one another. 
Moreover, even if we were to agree that this is the right question, we 
would still have to determine who should decide whether the benefits 
outweigh the costs of disclosure. Should this be decided by public officials 
whose responsibility it is to protect the national security? By public 
officials who might have an incentive to cover up their own mistakes? By 
low-level public officials who believe their superiors are keeping 
information secret for inadequate or illegitimate reasons—that is, by 
leakers? By reporters, editors, bloggers, and others who have gained access 
to the information? By judges and jurors, in the course of criminal 
prosecutions of leakers, journalists, and publishers?  
I will focus on two questions. First, in what circumstances can the 
government constitutionally punish a public employee for disclosing 
classified information to a journalist for the purpose of publication? That is, 
in what circumstances may the government punish leakers? Second, in 
what circumstances can the government constitutionally punish the 
publication or public dissemination of classified information? Should it 
matter whether the publisher or disseminator obtained the information 
through an illegal leak?  
IV. THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
The first question concerns the First Amendment rights of public 
employees. To understand those rights, we must establish a baseline. Let us 
begin, then, with the rights of individuals who are not government 
employees. That is, in what circumstances may ordinary people, who are 
482 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64 
not public employees, be held legally accountable for revealing information 
to another for the purpose of publication? Answering that question will 
enable us to establish a baseline definition of First Amendment rights. We 
can then inquire whether the First Amendment rights of government 
employees are any different. 
In general, an ordinary individual (an individual who is not a 
government employee) has a broad First Amendment right to reveal 
information to journalists or others for the purpose of publication. There 
are a few limitations, however.  
First, the Supreme Court has long recognized that there are certain 
“limited classes of speech,” such as false statements of fact, obscenity, and 
threats, that “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas” and are 
therefore of only low First Amendment value.14 Such speech may be 
restricted without satisfying the usual demands of the First Amendment. 
For example, if X makes a knowingly false and defamatory statement about 
Y to a journalist, with the understanding that the journalist will publish the 
information, X might be liable to Y for the tort of defamation.15 
Second, private individuals sometimes voluntarily contract with other 
private individuals to limit their speech. Violation of such a private 
agreement may be actionable as a breach of contract. For example, if X 
takes a job as a salesman and agrees as a condition of employment not to 
disclose his employer’s customer lists to competitors, he might be liable for 
breach of contract if he reveals the lists to a reporter for a trade journal with 
the expectation that the journal will publish the list. In such circumstances, 
the individual has voluntarily agreed to limit what otherwise would be a 
First Amendment right. Such privately negotiated waivers of constitutional 
rights are generally enforceable.16 
Third, there may be situations, however rare, in which an individual 
discloses previously nonpublic information to a journalist in circumstances 
in which publication of the information would be so dangerous to society 
that the individual might be punished for disclosing the information to the 
journalist for purposes of further dissemination. For example, suppose a 
privately-employed scientist discovers how to manufacture anthrax bacteria 
at home. The harm caused by the public dissemination of that information 
might be so likely, imminent, and grave that the scientist could be punished 
for facilitating its publication.17  
                                                                                                             
 14.  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
 15.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 16.  See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
 17.  See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
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These examples illustrate the few circumstances in which an 
individual might be held legally responsible for disclosing information to 
another for the purpose of public dissemination. In general, however, the 
First Amendment guarantees individuals very broad freedom to share 
information with others for the purpose of publication. 
To what extent is a government employee in a similar position? When 
we ask about the First Amendment rights of public employees, we must 
focus on the second of the three situations examined above. That is, it is the 
waiver of rights issue that poses the critical question. Although the first and 
third situations can arise in the government employee context, it is the 
waiver issue that is at the core of the matter.  
At its most bold, the government’s position is simple: just like a 
private individual, the government should be able to enter into contracts 
with people in which they voluntarily agree to waive their constitutional 
rights. As long as the waiver is voluntary, that should end the matter. That 
is not the law, however. The Supreme Court has long recognized that, 
unlike private entities, the government cannot constitutionally insist that 
individuals surrender their constitutional rights as a condition of public 
employment or receipt of other government benefits.18 It would be 
unconstitutional, for example, for the government to require individuals to 
agree as a condition of government employment that they will never 
criticize the president, never practice the Muslim faith, never have an 
abortion, or never assert their constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.19 
It would be no answer for the government to point out that the 
individuals had voluntarily agreed not to criticize the president, practice 
their faith, have an abortion, or assert their Fourth Amendment rights, for 
even if individuals consent to surrender their constitutional rights in order 
to obtain a government job, the government cannot constitutionally 
condition employment on the waiver of those rights. The government 
cannot legitimately use its leverage over jobs, welfare benefits, driver’s 
licenses, tax deductions, zoning waivers, and the like to extract waivers of 
individual freedoms.20  
This does not mean, however, that the government can never require 
individuals to waive their constitutional rights as a condition of public 
                                                                                                             
18.   See, e.g., Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. at 663. 
 19.  See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“[E]ven though a person has no 
‘right’ to a valuable government benefit and even though the government may deny him the 
benefit for any number of reasons,” it may not do so “on a basis that infringes his 
constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech.”). 
 20.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889, 
915 (1986). 
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employment. There are at least two circumstances, relevant here, in which 
the government may restrict the First Amendment rights of its employees. 
First, as the Supreme Court recognized in its 1968 decision in Pickering v. 
Board of Education of Township High School District 205, the government 
“has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that 
differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of 
the speech of the citizenry in general.”21 The problem, the Court said, is to 
arrive at a sensible balance between the interests of the public employee, as 
a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern, and the interest of 
the government, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of its 
activities.22   
The Hatch Act, for instance, prohibits government employees from 
taking an active part in political campaigns.23 The goal is to insulate 
government employees from undue political pressure and improper 
influence. To enable government employees to perform their jobs properly, 
the government may require them to waive what would otherwise be the 
First Amendment right to participate in partisan political activities.24 
Similarly, a government employee’s disclosure of confidential information 
to a journalist might jeopardize the government’s ability to function 
effectively. For example, if an IRS employee gives X’s confidential tax 
records to a reporter, this might seriously impair the public’s confidence in 
the tax system and thus undermine the government’s capacity to function 
efficiently. 
A second reason why the government may sometimes restrict what 
otherwise would be the protected First Amendment rights of government 
employees is that the employee learns the information only by virtue of his 
government employment. Arguably, it is one thing for the government to 
prohibit its employees from speaking in ways other citizens can speak, but 
something else entirely for it to prohibit them from speaking in ways other 
citizens cannot speak. If a government employee gains access to 
confidential information only because of his public employment, then 
prohibiting him from disclosing that information to anyone outside the 
government might be said not to substantially restrict his First Amendment 
rights, because he had no right to know the information in the first place.25  
                                                                                                             
 21.  391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
22.   Id. 
23.   7 U.S.C. § 361(a) (2006). 
 24.  See U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 
(1973); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). 
 25.  See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984); Robert C. Post, The 
Management of Speech: Discretion and Rights, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 169. 
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There is little clear law on this question. In its 1980 decision in Snepp 
v. United States, however, the Supreme Court held that a former employee 
of the CIA could constitutionally be held to his agreement not to publish 
“any information or material relating to the [CIA]” without prior 
approval.26 The Court did not suggest that every government employee can 
be required to abide by such a rule. Rather, it emphasized that a “former 
intelligence agent’s publication of . . . material relating to intelligence 
activities can be detrimental to vital national interests.”27 In light of Snepp 
and Pickering, it seems reasonable to assume that a public employee who 
discloses to a journalist or other disseminator classified information, the 
disclosure of which could appreciably harm the national security, has 
violated his position of trust and ordinarily may be discharged and even 
criminally punished without violating the First Amendment. 
Now, it is important to note that this conclusion is specific to 
government employees. It does not govern those who are not government 
employees. Unlike government employees, who have agreed to abide by 
constitutionally permissible restrictions of their speech, journalists and 
others who might disseminate such information have not agreed to waive 
their rights. This distinction between government employees and other 
individuals is critical in the context of confidential information. 
Information the government wants to keep secret may be of great value to 
the public. The public disclosure of an individual’s tax return may 
undermine the public’s confidence in the tax system, but it may also reveal 
important information, for example, about a political candidate’s finances.  
In theory, of course, it would be possible for courts to decide in each 
instance whether the First Amendment protects an unauthorized disclosure 
of confidential information by a government employee by deciding whether 
the value of the information to the public outweighs the government’s 
interest in secrecy. But, as already noted, such case-by-case judgments 
would put courts in an exceedingly awkward and difficult position and 
would in effect convert the First Amendment into a constitutional Freedom 
of Information Act. The Supreme Court has eschewed that approach and 
has instead granted the government considerable deference in deciding 
whether and when government employees have a constitutional right to 
disclose confidential government information. In short, the courts have 
generally held that the government may punish a government employee for 
the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, as long as the 
disclosure would be “potentially damaging to the United States.”28  
                                                                                                             
 26.  444 U.S. 507, 508 (1980). 
 27.  Id. at 511–12; see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). 
 28.  United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1071 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. 
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This is a far cry from requiring the government to prove that the 
disclosure will create a clear and present danger of grave harm to the 
nation. The gap between these two standards represents the difference 
between the rights of government employees and the rights of other 
individuals. It is what the government employee surrenders as a condition 
of his employment; it is the effect of Pickering balancing; and it is a 
measure of the deference we grant the government in the management of 
its internal affairs. 
There is, of course, a fundamental disadvantage in this approach. 
Information may be both potentially dangerous to national security and 
valuable to public debate. Consider, for example, evaluations of new 
weapons systems or government policies regulating the permissible 
conduct of covert agents. One might reasonably argue that this information 
should be available to the public to enable informed public discussion of 
such policies. But the approach to government employee speech just 
described ordinarily will empower the government to forbid the disclosure 
of such information, regardless of its value to public discourse. We accept 
this approach largely for the sake of simplicity and ease of administration. 
We should be under no illusions, however, about its impact. This standard 
gives inordinate weight to secrecy at the expense of accountability and 
public deliberation. 
V. THE RIGHT TO DISSEMINATE INFORMATION 
This, then, presents the second question: in what circumstances may 
the government constitutionally prohibit an individual or organization from 
publishing or disseminating unlawfully leaked classified information? In 
the entire history of the United States, the government has never prosecuted 
anyone (other than a government employee) for publicly disseminating 
such information.29 
Because there has never been such a prosecution, the Supreme Court 
has never had occasion to rule on such a case. The closest it has come to 
such a situation was New York Times Co. v. United States, commonly 
known as the Pentagon Papers case, in which the Court held 
unconstitutional the government’s effort to enjoin the New York Times and 
the Washington Post from publishing a purloined copy of a top secret 
Defense Department study of the Vietnam War.30 Justice Potter Stewart’s 
opinion best captures the view of the Court. “We are asked,” he wrote:  
                                                                                                             
Rosen, No. 1:05cr225, slip op. at 25 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2006). 
29.  See generally Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Sunstein, supra note 20. 
 30.  403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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[T]o prevent the publication . . . of material that the Executive Branch 
insists should not, in the national interest, be published. I am convinced 
that the Executive is correct with respect to some of the documents 
involved. But I cannot say that disclosure of any of them will surely 
result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or 
its people.31  
Thus, in the Pentagon Papers case, the Court held that although 
elected officials have broad authority to keep classified information secret, 
once that information gets into other hands the government has only very 
limited authority to prevent its further dissemination. This may seem an 
awkward, even incoherent, state of affairs. If the government can 
constitutionally prohibit public employees from disclosing classified 
information to others, why can’t it enjoin the recipients of that material 
from disseminating it further?  
But one could just as easily flip the question. If individuals have a 
First Amendment right to publish classified information unless publication 
will “surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our 
Nation or its people,” why should the government be allowed to prohibit its 
employees from disclosing that information to others merely because it 
poses a potential danger to national security?32 If we view the issue from 
the perspective of either the public’s interest in informed discourse or the 
government’s interest in secrecy, it would seem that the same rule logically 
should apply to both public employees and those who would disseminate 
the information. The very different standards governing government 
employees on the one hand, and other speakers on the other, thus present a 
puzzle. 
In fact, there are quite sensible reasons for this seemingly awkward 
state of affairs. Although the government has broad authority to prohibit 
public employees from leaking classified information, that rule is based not 
on a careful or definitive balancing of the government’s need for secrecy 
against the public’s interest in the information, but on the need for a clear 
and easily administrable rule for government employees.33 For the sake of 
simplicity, the law governing public employees overprotects the 
government’s legitimate interest in secrecy relative to the public’s 
legitimate interest in learning about the activities of the government. But 
the need for a simple rule for public employees has nothing to do with the 
rights of others who would publish the information or the needs of the 
public for an informed public discourse. And under ordinary First 
Amendment standards, those who wish to disseminate such information 
                                                                                                             
 31.  Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
32.  Id. 
33.  5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (2006). 
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have the right to do so—unless the government can demonstrate that the 
publication presents a clear and present danger of grave harm. In this 
situation, the law arguably overprotects the right to publish, as compared to 
a case-by-case balancing of costs and benefits.  
As Justice Stewart observed in the Pentagon Papers case, even though 
the publication of some of the materials at issue might harm “the national 
interest,” their dissemination could not constitutionally be prohibited unless 
their dissemination would “surely result in direct, immediate, and 
irreparable damage to our Nation or its people.”34 It is important to note 
that there are sound reasons for this conclusion.  
First, the mere fact that dissemination might harm the national interest 
does not mean that that harm outweighs the benefits of publication. Second, 
a case-by-case balancing of harm against benefit would ultimately prove 
unwieldy, unpredictable, and impracticable. Thus, just as in the government 
employee situation, there is a compelling need for a clear and predictable 
rule. Third, as we have learned from our own history, there are great 
pressures that lead both government officials and the public itself to 
underestimate the benefits of publication and overstate the potential harm 
of publication in times of national anxiety. A strict clear and present danger 
standard serves as a barrier to protect us against this danger.  
Finally, a central principle of the First Amendment is that the 
suppression of public speech must be the government’s last rather than its 
first resort in addressing a potential problem. If there are other means by 
which government can prevent or reduce the danger, it must exhaust those 
other means before it can suppress the freedom of speech. This, too, is an 
essential premise of the clear and present danger standard. In the secrecy 
situation, the most obvious way for government to prevent the danger is by 
ensuring that seriously damaging information is not leaked in the first 
place. Indeed, the Supreme Court made this point quite clearly in its 2001 
decision in Bartnicki v. Vopper, in which a radio commentator received in 
the mail from an anonymous source a tape recording of an unlawfully 
intercepted telephone conversation, which the commentator then played on 
the air.35 The Court held that the broadcast was protected by the First 
Amendment, even though the anonymous source could be prosecuted for 
committing the unlawful wiretap.36 As the Court explained, when an 
individual receives information “from a source who has obtained it 
unlawfully,” an individual may not be punished for publicly disseminating 
information relevant to public discourse, “absent a need . . . of the highest 
                                                                                                             
 34.   Perry, 403 U.S. at 730. 
 35.   532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
36.   Id.  
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order.”37 The Court reasoned that if “the sanctions that presently attach to 
[unlawful wiretapping] do not provide sufficient deterrence,” then “perhaps 
those sanctions should be made more severe,” but “it would be quite 
remarkable to hold” that an individual can constitutionally be punished 
merely for disseminating information because the government failed to 
“deter conduct by a non-law-abiding third party.”38 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This is surely a “disorderly situation,” but it seems the best possible 
solution.39 If we grant the government too much power to punish those who 
disseminate information useful to public debate, then we risk too great a 
sacrifice of public deliberation. If we grant the government too little power 
to control confidentiality at the source, then we risk too great a sacrifice of 
secrecy and government efficiency.40 The solution is thus to attempt to 
reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable values of secrecy and accountability 
by guaranteeing both a strong authority of the government to prohibit leaks 
and an expansive right of others to disseminate them.  
Three questions remain: first, does the same constitutional standard 
govern criminal prosecutions and prior restraints? Second, what sorts of 
disclosures might satisfy the clear and present danger standard? And third, 
how should we deal with information that both satisfies the clear and 
present danger standard and contributes significantly to public debate?  
First, in the Pentagon Papers case, the Court emphasized that it was 
dealing with an injunction against speech. An injunction is a prior restraint, 
a type of speech restriction that, in the Court’s words, bears a particularly 
“‘heavy presumption’ against its constitutional validity.”41 This raises the 
question whether the test stated in the Pentagon Papers case should govern 
criminal prosecutions as well as prior restraints.   
In dealing with expression at the very heart of the First Amendment— 
speech about the conduct of government itself—the distinction between 
prior restraint and criminal prosecution should not carry much weight. The 
standard applied in the Pentagon Papers case is essentially the same 
standard the Court would apply in a criminal prosecution of an organization 
or individual for publicly disseminating information about the conduct of 
                                                                                                             
 37.  Id. at 528. 
 38.  Id. at 529–30. 
39.  ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 80 (1975).  
 40.  Id. at 79–92. 
 41.  See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723 (1971); see also id. at 
730–31 (White, J., concurring). 
490 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64 
government. The clear and present danger standard has never been limited 
to cases of prior restraint. 
Second, is there any speech that could constitutionally be punished 
under this standard? The examples traditionally offered include the sailing 
dates of transports or the precise location of combat troops in wartime. The 
publication of such information would instantly make American troops 
vulnerable to enemy attack and thwart battle plans already underway. Other 
examples might include publication of the identities of covert CIA 
operatives in Iran, or public disclosure that the government has broken the 
Taliban’s secret code, thus alerting the enemy to change its cipher. In 
situations like these, the harm from publication might be sufficiently likely, 
imminent, and grave to warrant punishing the disclosure. 
Third, an important feature of these examples often passes unnoticed. 
What makes these situations so compelling is not only the likelihood, 
imminence, and magnitude of the harm, but also the implicit assumption 
that this sort of information do not meaningfully contribute to public 
debate. In most circumstances, there is no evident need for the public to 
know the secret sailing dates of transports or the secret location of 
American troops on the eve of battle. It is not as if these matters will 
instantly be topics of political discussion. After the fact, of course, such 
information may be critical in evaluating the effectiveness of our military 
leaders, but at the very moment the ships are set to sail or the troops are set 
to attack, it is less clear what contribution the information would make to 
public debate. The point is not that these examples involve low value 
speech in the conventional sense of the term, but rather that they involve 
information that does not seem particularly newsworthy at the moment of 
publication. It is this factor that seems to play an implicit role in making the 
illustrations so compelling. 
The failure to notice this feature of these hypotheticals can lead to a 
critical failure of analysis. Interestingly, an analogous failure was implicit 
in the famous example Justice Holmes first used to elucidate the clear and 
present danger test—the false cry of fire in a crowded theatre.42 Why can 
the false cry of fire be restricted? Because it creates a clear and present 
danger of a mad dash to the exits. Therefore, Holmes reasoned, the test for 
restricting speech must be whether it creates a clear and present danger of 
serious harm.  
But Holmes’s reasoning was incomplete. Suppose the cry of fire is 
true? In that case, we would not punish the speech—even though it still 
causes a mad dash to the exits—because the value of the speech outweighs 
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the harm it creates. Thus, at least two factors must be considered in 
analyzing this situation—the harm caused by the speech and the value of 
the speech. Suppose, for example, a newspaper accurately reports that 
American troops in Afghanistan recently murdered twenty members of the 
Taliban in cold blood. As a result of this publication, members of the 
Taliban predictably kidnap and murder twenty American citizens. Can the 
newspaper constitutionally be punished for disclosing the initial massacre? 
The answer must be no. Even if there were a clear and present danger that 
the retaliation would follow, and even if we agree—as we must—that this 
were a grave harm, the information is simply too important to the American 
people to punish its disclosure.   
What this suggests is that to justify the criminal punishment of the 
press for publishing classified information, the government must prove not 
only that the defendant published classified information, the publication of 
which would result in likely, imminent, and grave harm to national 
security, but also that the publication would not significantly contribute to 
public debate.  
The bottom line is this: the proposed SHIELD Act is plainly 
unconstitutional. At the very least, its prohibition must be limited to those 
circumstances in which the individual who publicly disseminates classified 
information knew that the dissemination would create a clear and present 
danger of grave harm to the nation or its people. A criminal prosecution of 
Julian Assange or WikiLeaks would thus violate the First Amendment. On 
the other hand, as a government employee, Bradley Manning was subject to 
more significant restrictions on his freedom to leak classified information. 
He is therefore in a much more vulnerable position. 
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